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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Iran nuclear deal remains controversial, primarily 
because of  lingering questions around whether it 
is delivering the benefits promised to all sides and, 
secondarily, because of  residual complaints about how 
it was negotiated and advertised in Washington and in 
Tehran. Despite this, it has already achieved much, having 
lengthened the timetable that would be required for Iran to 
turn its nuclear program toward the production of  material 
for nuclear weapons; established the mechanisms through 
which the world would have greater transparency into the 
nuclear program for the next twenty to twenty-five years; 
and relieved sanctions on most of  Iran’s economic activity.
Though nuclear implementation has gone largely according 
to plan, the same cannot be said of  sanctions relief. Though 
legally everything the P5+1 and UNSC are required to do 
under the deal has taken place, practical fulfillment of  the 
sanctions relief  has been halting. There are various reasons 
for this, but they lie in three general areas: low oil prices; 
Iran’s own internal regulatory and bureaucratic problems; 
and residual effects from the remaining US financial 
sanctions against Iran and its banks. Not all of  these issues 
are tied directly to the implementation of  the JCPOA, but 
inadequate attention to these issues will undermine the 
deal just as surely as if  they were a core provision of  the 
agreement.
With respect to low oil prices, there is little that the 
United States or its partners can do that would address 
Iran’s difficulties. However, with respect to Iran’s internal 
problems and the residual effects of  sanctions, more can 
be done in Iran and in the United States. 
For Iran, these steps include
1. domestic reform to sustain banking operations that 
conform to international standards for anti–money 
laundering, tax compliance, financial disclosure, capital 
adequacy, and, critically, stopping the financing of  
terrorism; 
2. reform of  the bureaucratic process that makes 
it difficult for foreign companies and domestic 
entrepreneurs to operate in the country; and 
3. pursuit of  more constructive foreign and domestic 
policies that reduce tensions in the Middle East and 
give rise to concerns that the sanctions situation will 
once again get worse.
For the United States, there are limits as to how far the 
Obama administration (and its successors) should go, given 
the continued problems that exist both in how the Iranian 
economy operates and what the Iranian government does 
with the proceeds, particularly in the financing of  terrorism. 
Some steps that have been suggested—such as the 
elimination of  most residual sanctions or the establishment 
of  clear US-focused banking channels—would either meet 
impossible political headwinds or exacerbate the problems 
they seek to solve.
That said, reasonable additional steps that can be taken, 
largely by the Treasury Department, such as
1. promulgation of  additional guidance and information 
on the standards the United States intends to use in 
judging foreign due diligence to prevent Iranian bad 
actors from receiving direct benefits from business and 
how best to undertake the recusal of  US persons from 
foreign business decisions involving Iran;
2. further licensing to ease the compliance burden 
imposed on foreign companies to permit the limited 
use of  standard US business software and other 
services that do not enhance the ability of  companies 
to do business with Iran, but make it logistically and 
financially possible; and
3. other similar nonmaterial, and—ultimately—modest 
steps to aid in the implementation of  remaining 
US sanctions in this different, JCPOA-informed 
environment, such as permitting technical compliance 
support by US lawyers and experts to foreign 
companies engaged in Iran trade.
Ultimately, and as unsatisfying as it may be, time may be 
the most important element of  Iran’s return to a more 
normal relationship with the international economy. Time 
will permit Iran’s compliance with its nuclear obligations 
to continue to be established and international companies 
and banks to regain their confidence in doing business in 
the country. Time will also enable Iran to make the kind 
of  regulatory and bureaucratic reforms necessary for the 
Iranians to have the kind of  economy that they appear to 
desire, at least at the level of  government technocrats, and 
to develop the political will to make the necessary changes 
at home. And time will permit the international community 
to form a complete picture of  the future of  US policy 
toward Iran and the JCPOA after the upcoming presidential 
election. Unfortunately, time may also not be on the side 
of  these Iranian leaders, facing as they do claims that they 
were suckered in their negotiations with the United States 
and the rest of  the P5+1. The trick, therefore, will be to 
ensure that Iran is able to make more progress, even if  
halting, in its reintegration into the global economy and the 
rigorous monitoring of  its progress.
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Though a year has passed since negotiations concluded 
over the Iran nuclear deal—officially known as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of  Action (JCPOA)—and six months 
have passed since it was implemented fully, the JCPOA 
remains a subject of  intense controversy. Skeptics in the 
United States and in Iran continue to share remarkably 
similar perspectives on the deal, each side believing that 
their governments sacrificed too much in its achievement. 
Governments, banks, and companies around the world 
remain confused about the parameters of  the deal and 
worried that one false move will damn their economic and 
political futures. Analysts around the world continue to 
debate whether all sides have done enough to ensure the 
JCPOA is a success.
All of  this is as I predicted in July 2015, particularly as relates 
to the slow start that Iran is experiencing in its enjoyment 
of  JCPOA sanctions relief.1 Certainly, there have been 
some surprises along the way. Like many analysts, I did not 
believe that Iran would be able to complete its required 
nuclear steps until six months at the earliest after Adoption 
Day in October 2015. Instead, Iran finished its work in 
three months, and Implementation Day was observed 
on January 16, 2016. But with respect to Iran’s use of  
the sanctions relief  it purchased with nuclear restrictions 
and intrusive transparency, there is little in the delay that 
Iran has experienced that is shocking. Iran remains a 
difficult place in which to do business, with a complicated 
bureaucratic, regulatory, and constitutional system that 
prevents foreign businesses from having easy access to the 
country. Moreover, the threat of  international sanctions—
either from the reimposition of  those suspended pursuant 
to the JCPOA or those remaining in place notwithstanding 
the JCPOA—continues to chill foreign business interest 
in the country. Volatile politics in the United States and 
in Iran probably have contributed as well to a sense of  
unease when foreign companies look to Iran.
This paper will review the major elements of  the JCPOA 
sanctions relief  and provide an update on the results Iran 
has achieved thus far in its use of  the relief. The paper 
will delve deeper into some of  the reasons for the delay in 
Iran’s ability to take advantage of  sanctions relief  along the 
way. It will then offer views on how the United States and 
Iran (primarily) can ameliorate these problems. The paper 
concludes with thoughts on the JCPOA’s implementation 
thus far and what the future may bring.
It is important to note from the outset that the perspective 
taken in this paper is that the JCPOA is a valuable 
contribution to international security and therefore merits 
preservation. However, this position does not imply—and 
should not be taken as implying—a readiness to preserve 
the JCPOA at all costs and, particularly, if  its fundamental 
objectives are no longer being satisfied. The JCPOA is a 
means to an end—ironically, the same end as the sanctions 
measures that it replaced: the imposition of  restraints on 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities that create confidence that Iran is 
neither pursuing nor intends to pursue nuclear weapons. So 
long as the JCPOA is able to fulfill this objective, it remains 
the most economical tool in the US arsenal for doing so; it 
is on this basis that the deal merits being sustained.
Moreover, this paper does not argue against the continued 
use of  US sanctions tools to address nonnuclear Iranian 
illicit conduct nor does it argue against maintaining the 
US extensive embargo, aside from those exceptions cut 
into the JCPOA already. These tools exist for a reason, 
and Iran should experience consequences for its support 
of  terrorism, violations of  human rights, and destabilizing 
regional activities. However, it is my view that though 
sanctions may contribute to solutions of  these problems, 
sanctions are not as useful in addressing these problems 
as they were in the nuclear context, in large part because 
of  the differing global opinions on the appropriateness 
of  Iran’s activities and of  sanctions to correct them. The 
nuclear issue was one that many countries saw as a national 
priority, which—regrettably—is not the case for human 
rights or the support of  terrorism. Even then, the United 
States had to engage in significant arm twisting to make 
the nuclear issue sufficiently relevant to some countries 
to make it worthwhile to engage in sanctions. Given 
this difference in views, other efforts—such as regional 
security cooperation and different forms of  pressure on 
Iran, especially international political pressure—should be 
the focus of  government policy targeting such conduct.
Iran is not a reformed state and US-Iranian relations 
are not (and will not anytime soon) return to anything 
approximating normal. There is simply too much bad 
blood on both sides and disagreement on fundamental 
issues to suggest that rapprochement is in the offing. 
However, this simple reality should also not preclude 
efforts intended to improve the environment such that 
normalization and stabilization of  the relationship can 
be achieved in the future. Ensuring that the JCPOA is 
successful is a key element of  this effort.
INTRODUCTION
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JCPOA TO DATE
The JCPOA has two essential components: the 
establishment of  restrictions and transparency over the 
Iranian nuclear program; and the provision of  sanctions 
relief  by the UN Security Council (UNSC), the European 
Union, and the United States. 
Nuclear Matters
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
released three reports on Iranian compliance with the 
JCPOA since the beginning of  2016. The first report, 
released on January 16, outlined the various steps that Iran 
has taken to fulfill its major initial JCPOA commitments.2 
It was on the basis of  this report that the United States, 
European Union, and UNSC acted to bring the JCPOA 
fully into force by executing the required sanctions relief.
On February 26, the IAEA released its second report.3 
This report was controversial less because of  its contents 
and more because of  the absence of  some of  the data 
that nongovernmental observers and organizations had 
become used to seeing in IAEA reports. In particular, 
the IAEA was criticized for not publishing data on Iran’s 
exact low-enriched uranium stockpile, which had become 
a normal attribute of  IAEA reporting since Iran restarted 
uranium enrichment in 2007.4 The nature of  this concern 
focused less on the degree to which Iran was fulfilling its 
commitments and more on the degree of  transparency 
that the IAEA (and, by extension, the United States, Iran, 
and the JCPOA parties) was showing into Iran’s nuclear 
program so as to permit “independent determination of  
Iran’s compliance” with the JCPOA.5 Though reasonable 
people may disagree on the importance of  the public 
dissemination of  such data (as the IAEA has expressed 
confidence that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is within 
the 300 kilogram limit established in the JCPOA), the 
flap over the content of  the IAEA’s report extended to 
a discussion at the IAEA’s quarterly Board of  Governors 
meeting in which the United States and its European 
partners called for greater transparency in IAEA reporting 
going forward.
This issue notwithstanding, the February IAEA report 
did provide information on one JCPOA compliance 
issue. The IAEA reported that Iran produced and then 
possessed slightly more than its JCPOA-allotted 130 
metric tonnes of  heavy water. Iran’s overage—which the 
IAEA measured at 0.9 metric tonnes—was then resolved 
by the export of  20 metric tonnes of  heavy water seven 
days after the overage was identified. 
On May 27, the IAEA released its third report, essentially 
repeating its conclusions from February, minus the 
indications that Iran had exceeded the threshold of  
allowable possession of  heavy water. It too, however, 
generated controversy for its sparse technical detail.
Among these three reports, the IAEA has reported that 
there was one technical breach of  the JCPOA that the 
Iranians remedied within a week of  being discovered. 
This breach was not only modest in its import—as heavy 
water is not a nuclear weapons–usable commodity itself  
but rather a component in the production of  plutonium 
for use in nuclear weapons—but also something that is 
entirely expected in the implementation of  a deal of  this 
sort. Iran will likely violate the terms of  this provision 
again and perhaps similarly the provision dealing with 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) stocks because they are 
products of  an ongoing process line that must be exported 
shortly after production. Any problem with shipping 
these commodities out of  the country would lead to the 
potential for a temporary excess in Iranian stocks of  these 
materials. The real sensitivity in this regard is the degree 
to which Iran believes that it can engage in these activities 
and not be caught. If  nothing else, the heavy water incident 
suggests the opposite: the IAEA’s identification of  the 
excess heavy water occurred quickly—Iran’s production 
of  the 0.9 metric tonnes of  excess heavy water occurred 
between January 16 and its identification on February 
17—and Iran had to take swift remedial action to address 
the problem.
The IAEA reports do not address another element 
of  the deal, which is continued, permitted Iranian 
nuclear procurement via a dedicated mechanism. When 
negotiations on the JCPOA commenced in January 2014, 
an interesting—if  little recognized—quandary emerged 
for negotiators on both sides: how to handle permitted 
Iranian nuclear procurements while its nuclear program 
remained, in effect, on probation. 
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The easiest option from Iran’s perspective was for the 
United States and its partners to remove any controls on 
its nuclear procurement, essentially eliminating the nuclear 
program’s pariah status in response to the nuclear deal. 
However, for P5+1 negotiators, this was unacceptable 
because it would be tantamount to an early declaration 
that Iran’s nuclear program was now entirely aboveboard. 
This, at the end of  the day, is what the JCPOA is intended 
to demonstrate, and both time and confidence-building 
measures were required by P5+1 countries in order to 
prove exactly this point. Moreover, the risk here was not 
merely rhetorical: unrestricted Iranian nuclear-related 
procurement could contribute to the creation of  a covert 
nuclear program, something that most nonproliferation 
experts in the six countries believed was the most likely 
vector for any future Iranian nuclear weapons program. 
At the same time, P5+1 negotiators recognized that Iran 
would require procurements to support its legitimizing 
nuclear program, especially those projects that were 
enshrined in the text, such as the modification of  the Arak 
Reactor and former uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. 
Additionally, it was recognized that Iran would require 
some goods for its other industrial processes that are dual 
use (meaning that they could be utilized in both nuclear 
and nonnuclear applications). These goods included 
specialty metals and process equipment (like valves and 
pressure sensors). Adding a further complication, many of  
these goods also have applications in Iran’s ballistic missile 
program, which would remain under restrictions under the 
nuclear deal and unilateral sanctions by the United States.
The result of  these negotiations was the creation of  a 
mechanism for Iran’s procurement of  nuclear goods, 
based at the UN but effectively run by the members of  
the P5+1, which approves or disapproves procurement 
requests made by Iran.* 
The mechanism has been praised by some, including me, 
as being an artful way to untie an otherwise troublesome 
knot of  policy, technical, and economic issues. Others have 
underscored that the complexity of  the system will present 
several implementation challenges,6 which could prompt 
complaints from Iran if  they led to significant delays in 
business activity. Still others have suggested that it could 
be effectively gamed by a determined Iranian proliferation 
network, skilled at sanctions and export control evasion 
after decades at the job.7 However, even an interim grade 
for the channel is difficult to give because, insofar as public 
reporting is concerned, there have been no requests made 
via the procurement channel nor indications given as to 
how requests are being evaluated.
 In all likelihood, the delay in utilization of  the procurement 
channel is explained by continued and deserved hesitation 
in exporting to Iran goods that could contribute to its 
nuclear program, even if  their use in legitimate purpose 
is verifiable. A close second, however, is the difficulty that 
remains in conducting all manner of  business with Iran.
Sanctions Relief
The United States, the European Union, and the UNSC 
have undertaken all of  the sanctions relief  steps required 
pursuant to the JCPOA† However, as noted with respect 
to nuclear procurement, the practical implementation of  
the economic benefits of  the relief  has been slower than 
Iranian government expectations (at least those they stirred 
in public) due to a combination of  economic, political, and 
physical factors.
Oil-Related Measures
As a result of  the JCPOA, Iran is now permitted to export 
as much oil as its customers wish to buy. However, therein 
lies the rub: Iran’s reemergence into the international oil 
market has occurred at a time in which the oil market is 
oversupplied and prices are low. This has impeded Iran’s 
ability to take full advantage of  its JCPOA-provided relief  
thus far, particularly in combination with other economic 
factors (such as Iran’s access to international financial 
services, which will be discussed in the next section). There 
are two distinct areas of  oil-related sanctions that merit 
consideration: Iran’s ability to sell oil; and Iran’s ability to 
garner investment in its oil and gas sector.
* More information on the operation of  the channel was provid-
ed by the UN at its website, http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/
restrictions-nuclear.shtml.
SIX MONTHS LATER: ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL
8 |  CENTER ON GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY | COLUMBIA SIPA
Table 1: Comparison of  Iranian oil sales in 2012 and projected sales in 2016
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Reuters, author’s calculations. 
With respect to oil sales, Iran could not have picked a worse 
time to come back onto the scene, especially in comparison 
to when its ability to sell oil freely was restricted in 2012. 
In 2012, oil fetched on average $111 per barrel (Brent). In 
2016, oil could cost as little as $42.30 per barrel on average 
(Brent), according to some traders.8  With oil priced at less 
than 40 percent of  what it was four years prior, Iran would 
require oil production levels not seen since the end of  the 
1970s in order to even match the revenue stream that it 
had in 2012 when sanctions were applied. Put another 
way, the impact of  oil reduction sanctions against Iran has 
now effectively been outstripped by the impact of  low oil 
prices, as the below table demonstrates, and this problem 
has nothing to do with US or European sanctions.
Yet Iran has proclaimed its intention to average 2 mbpd 
in oil exports throughout 2016 and has sought to project 
an image of  this as a serious objective, both at home and 
abroad. It has ramped up production, reporting to OPEC 
a 7 percent increase in oil production in the first quarter 
of  2016 as compared against 2015.9 OPEC’s secondary 
sources suggest that this production increase may be 
understated, though largely because these sources peg 
Iranian production in 2015 at 300,000 barrels per day less 
than Iran had claimed10 Either way, both OPEC and the 
International Energy Agency have reported that Iranian 
production reached 3.6 mbpd as of  the end of  May 2016.10,11
If  we limited our vantage point to solely current Iranian 
production and consumption patterns, however, it is 
difficult to see how Iran will be able to sustain 2 mbpd 
in exports. Iranian consumption was estimated to be 
approximately 1.9 mbpd on average in 2013, meaning that 
even at 3.6 mbpd in production as Iran currently claims, 
Iran would only be in a position to export approximately 
1.7 mbpd on average.13 With gas condensates, the amount 
may be higher, reaching 2.2 mbpd on average. Iranian 
Oil Minister Zanganeh may have been confirming this 
interpretation when he said on April 3, 2016, that Iranian 
production of  crude oil and condensates “jumped” by 
more than 250,000 barrels in March, permitting 2 mbpd 
to be put on the market.14 
† As a reminder, this does not include removal of  the compre-
hensive US embargo against Iran (also known as US “primary” 
sanctions). This embargo remains in effect. The provisions de-
scribed above should be construed, unless explicitly stated oth-
erwise, to only capture the effects of  US “secondary” sanctions 
on Iran, secondary sanctions being those that affect foreign 
business activities with other foreigners
2012 2016
Average annual exports 1.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) 2.0 mbpd
Average annual oil price $111.63 per barrel (Brent) $42.3 per barrel
Total per year $61.1 billion $30.9 billion
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‡ There is an alternative argument, namely that Iran may wish to 
hold onto this inventoried oil until the price rises. This is sensi-
ble from the perspective of  Iran’s long-term interest. However, 
if  one assumes that Rouhani’s short-term focus is on generating 
momentum behind the JCPOA and his foreign policy approach, 
then this economically sensible approach is less attractive. Either 
way, the drop in oil prices is continuing to delay Iran’s ability—
and perhaps its willingness—to sell oil now and generate the 
revenue that would come.
Iran is also likely tapping into its oil inventories. In fact, as 
negotiations with the P5+1 were concluding, press stories 
emerged suggesting that Iran might have as much as 40 
million barrels stored in cargo ships sitting off  the coast 
of  the country, waiting for sanctions to be lifted. With 
Implementation Day behind Iran, it began to dispatch 
some of  these vessels, eager to profit from what oil it could 
sell and, further, to attempt to reestablish market share lost 
starting in 2012. However, according to data gathered and 
reported by Windward, Iran’s floating storage of  oil has 
remained both high and largely static since mid-February at 
over 50 million barrels.15 One ship in particular, the Distya 
Akula, has been in transit to Europe for three months 
with 1 million barrels to off-load and apparently no buyer 
to receive it (though there may also be concerns with the 
quality of  the product, according to one reviewer of  this 
paper).16 In the context of  Iran’s total annual production 
(which one can extrapolate to 1.2 billion barrels, using 
Iran’s March 2016 reported figures), an inability to sell 50 
million barrels may seem fairly marginal. However, even at 
depressed prices, this oil is worth over $2 billion and nearly 
5 percent of  Iran’s total annual production. Iran would 
probably prefer to get this oil off  of  its hands as soon as 
possible and, as Zanganeh noted, “After lifting sanctions, 
Iran will take back the market share of  more than 1 million 
barrels a day that it lost…We should sell our oil whether 
the price falls or goes to $100 (a barrel)”17‡   
Seen in this context, the political wrangling that is taking 
place within OPEC and between OPEC and Russia over 
global oil production takes on significantly new meaning. 
Though some analysts discount the degree to which the 
Saudis are motivated to keep prices relatively low as a 
cudgel against its geopolitical rivals or impediments (like 
Iran), there is at least an incentive for the Saudis to do so 
insofar as limiting the overall benefit that Iran can receive 
from the JCPOA and its new oil position. Press reporting 
from April 2016 suggests that the Saudis were also taking 
other steps to complicate the activities of  companies and 
entities that seek to do business in Iran.18 Moreover, Iran’s 
refusal to accept a production freeze—even if  it could 
contribute to slightly higher prices—makes sense in this 
context. Even if  the price were to increase by just over 
$10 per barrel, Iran still earns more by bringing more oil 
to market than 1.5 mbpd. Table 2 demonstrates this point.
Table 2: Comparison of  Iranian oil sales in 2012 and project sales in 2016
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), Reuters, author’s calculations. 
2016: More Oil 2016: Higher Price
Average annual exports 2 mbpd 1.5 mbpd
Average annual oil price $42.30 per barrel (Brent) $55 per barrel
Total per year $30.9 billion $30.1 billion
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Figure 1: World upstream oil and gas investment
Source: IEA.20
Nevertheless, Iran is still constrained with respect to how 
much additional oil it can bring to market over time, even 
assuming Iran can find a market for its floating storage 
oil. Iran’s leaders have made this point, noting that they 
will require $50 billion in external investment annually to 
jump-start the oil industry and improve extraction beyond 
what was possible by, in essence, turning on the taps from 
existing fields.19 Unfortunately for Iran, it is here that two 
intersecting problems exist: first, with oil prices as low as 
they are, international investment in new oil production 
is declining in general, particularly in areas seen as risky; 
second, Iran’s reintegration with the global financial sector 
remains halting (more on this in the next section).
On the first point, it is no surprise that perceptions of  
a global oil glut combined with a lack of  revenue are 
prompting a reduction in investment among the world’s 
leading oil companies. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) reported to the G7 Energy Ministers on May 1–2, 
2016, that upstream investment has fallen by nearly $300 
billion since 2014 (Figure 1).
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Investment instead will naturally focus on sources that 
are midstream or those easiest and cheapest to extract, 
which—in theory—ought to privilege Iran as compared 
with artic or unconventional oil drilling (in fact, as one 
reviewer pointed out, most of  the drop in investment has 
been in these more complicated parts of  the industry). 
However, Iran has its own risks and complications that 
undermine its otherwise attractive, relatively low-cost 
production potential. The first is that Iran continues to 
require different investment arrangements than other 
countries due to its constitutional prohibition on the 
ownership of  its oil reserves by foreigners. This provision 
is a historical legacy of  a country that has felt preyed upon 
by international oil companies in the past and betrayed by 
its political leaders who granted inappropriate concessions 
to oil companies. But Iran would also like to be able to get 
the oil it possesses out of  the ground, particularly given 
that—even with changes to the Iranian economy—oil 
remains the major export commodity. Since the Iranian 
revolution, Iran has sought to find workarounds to its 
constitutional predicament, offering complicated buyback 
and lease options in the 1990s that most oil companies 
found cumbersome, difficult, and less profitable. 
Even now Iran is working on a revised Iran Petroleum 
Contract (IPC) that would try once more to bridge the gap 
between its desired approach and that of  oil companies. 
But herein lies the second problem: Iranian internal 
politics. Iran’s leadership remains divided on a variety of  
issues, especially the degree to which involvement with 
the outside world is a necessary component of  economic 
development (and, under the surface, perhaps a more 
fundamental question of  just how much development Iran 
should seek in any event). For this reason, the new IPC 
has yet to be fully finished, and in fact, former Iranian 
oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, who himself  is a former 
IRGC officer, was fired from his advisory position in the 
Iranian government, reportedly in response to Ghasemi’s 
obstructionism over the new IPC.21 As late as April 26, 
2016, Iran’s oil minister noted that the revised IPC remains 
under development and that though the general terms 
are known, no draft contract has yet been concluded.22 
Deputy Oil Minister Javadi indicated on May 5, 2016, that 
the IPC would be finalized by “June, July…” implying a 
desire rather than a concrete rollout plan.23 The shake-
up in mid-June 2016 at NIOC (in which its managing 
director was replaced along with several board members) 
is indicative of  further turmoil but may point to a more 
imminent decision on the part of  Iran to put out the 
new IPC. To this point, it is worth noting that Iran first 
started considering a revised approach to its investment 
contract in 2013 with the election of  President Rouhani. 
Taken in combination with the prevailing risk of  sanctions 
reimposition, if  Iranian violations of  the JCPOA were 
to be detected and the bureaucratic environment in Iran 
complicated, many oil companies would remain in the 
tentative, exploratory stages of  investment decisions.
Financial-Related Measures
Certainly, there were those who believed that Iran would 
be able to take complete advantage of  its reconnection 
with the international financial system at the outset of  
implementation of  the JCPOA. One noted critic of  the 
JCPOA termed Iran’s resumption of  financial ties as 
“precipitous”24 and argued that the JCPOA “dismantles 
much of  the international sanctions architecture”25 in 
service of  insufficient nuclear concessions on Iran’s part. 
Other criticisms suggested that, particularly as a result 
of  Iran’s resumed access to financial system services—
such as the Society of  Worldwide International Financial 
Transactions (SWIFT)—“the relaxed banking standards 
will grant the Iranian regime the ability to move its money 
anywhere in the world. With EU sanctions also set to be 
lifted on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, major 
IRGC companies§ and banks, and the Quds Force, the 
IRGC’s extraterritorial terrorist arm, Europe will become 
an economic free zone for Iran’s terrorist activity.”26 The 
ultimate conclusion of  these arguments was that, “with 
the Central Bank no longer in the vise-like grip of  the 
US Treasury, and with SWIFT messages flowing, Iran’s 
financial sector will soon be operating at pre-sanctions 
levels.”27 
Soon, of  course, is a relative term, but for its part, Iran 
has seen nothing near a resumption of  its presanctions 
integration with international banking. In fact, Iran’s 
reintegration with international banking has been 
sufficiently slow and vexing that the Supreme Leader of  
Iran used his annual Nowruz** speech to sharply criticize 
the United States of  using informal means of  imposing 
pressure on businesses and banks to avoid doing business 
with Iran.28 There are three likely reasons for the slow 
restart of  normal interactions with Iran: 
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1. Residual effects of  nonnuclear-related US financial 
sanctions, such as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which 
the JCPOA did not dismantle, and the possibility of  
reimposition of  sanctions;
2. Continued indications of  Iranian financial misconduct; 
and
3. Continued negative risk/reward calculations in the 
financial sector.
Residual Effects of  Nonnuclear Sanctions
Though underestimated in the days that immediately 
followed the JCPOA, the impact of  the residual 
nonnuclear sanctions against Iran is real. One of  the 
harshest critics of  the JCPOA, who suggested that the 
residual nonnuclear sanctions would have limited impact 
in slowing Iran’s rapid rise to economic resilience, noted 
in April, “I think the Iranians completely misjudged how 
the nonnuclear sanctions were going to deter international 
financial institutions.”29 But for those who were involved 
in the application of  those penalties against foreign banks, 
the likelihood of  these sanctions slowing reintegration was 
both recognized and real.30 Simply put, banks have been 
scared away from doing business with Iran because US 
sanctions that could have consequences for their access to 
the US financial sector still exist and are being enforced. 
This fear has been heightened by the degree to which 
sanctioned entities continue to play a major role in the 
Iranian economy, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps. Banks may have no clear way of  knowing 
for certain who is involved on the other side of  the various 
transactions that must take place but know, based on 
experience and watching others get caught, that sanctioned 
entities can intersperse themselves throughout the value 
chain in Iran. Consequently, banks face a real choice: 
avoid Iran altogether, or trust that their due diligence and 
compliance protocols (which Iran has shown a proclivity 
to attempt to defeat) are effective in weeding out the 
bad actors in the Iranian system or—at a minimum—
demonstrating their good will in a future sanctions case. 
Unfortunately for Iran, banks have not seen enough time 
pass to have a clear sense of  how the US Treasury will 
proceed to enforce sanctions under the JCPOA. They 
also retain some lingering fears that, even if  the federal 
government were to uphold the JCPOA, state and local 
government officials (such as the financial regulator for 
the State of  New York) could act differently. Their default 
view, reinforced by years of  tough sanctions enforcement, 
is to expect the worst. The possibility of  swift sanctions 
reimposition via the snap-back clause of  the JCPOA 
(or, as has been suggested by several US Republican 
presidential candidates, via US unilateral action) amplifies 
these concerns.
Continued Indications of  Iranian Financial Misconduct
Iran is not helping allay fears through its continued 
support of  terrorism via financial (as well as other) means. 
Though there is scant public reporting to the effect that 
Iran is transferring large sums of  cash to terrorist proxies 
and allies, the default assumption in the international 
community is that these behaviors persist, even if  there 
remains debate as to how much support is being provided 
and to what degree the JCPOA enabled it to increase. 
For this reason, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
issued a statement on February 19, 2016, that reaffirmed 
that it “remains particularly and exceptionally concerned 
about Iran’s failure to address the risk of  terrorist financing 
and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of  the 
international financial system.”31 The FATF sets anti–
money laundering and counterterrorist financing standards 
for financial institutions worldwide. Its recommendations 
and guidance are taken seriously in part because it is a 
rigorously technical body and no doubt in part because it 
is also composed of  a diverse group of  key members of  
the international financial community (the United States, 
members of  the European Union, Japan, Korea, China, 
Russia, and India, among others). 
On June 24, FATF amended its position on Iran by 
suspending the financial “countermeasures” that had 
§ Which, as a point of  fact, will not take place until Transition 
Day in 2023.
** Nowruz is an annual spring holiday celebrated throughout 
South-Southwest Asia, especially in Iran. Nowruz marks the 
beginning of  the Persian New Year.
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been called for to prevent Iranian money-laundering 
and financing of  terrorism. (These countermeasures 
are essentially prohibitive due diligence and screening 
protocols that would have the effect of  stymieing 
financial transactions with the jurisdiction subject to 
the countermeasures.) However, this suspension is for 
one year, renewable only if  Iran has made progress in 
implementing an agreed Action Plan with FATF that is 
intended to clean up the Iranian financial system. FATF 
noted, “Until Iran implements the measures required to 
address the deficiencies identified in the Action Plan, the 
FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing 
risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the 
international financial system. The FATF, therefore, calls 
on its members and urges all jurisdictions to continue to 
advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due 
diligence to business relationships and transactions with 
natural and legal persons from Iran…”32 
Iran now has a window of  opportunity to improve its 
financial conduct. But in the face of  such a recommendation 
and absent improvement, it is understandable why 
international financial institutions are keeping their 
distance from Iran and will continue to do so. 
Continued Negative Risk/Reward Calculations in the Financial 
Sector
Banker caution aside, there is probably a financial incentive 
level at which it would be possible to convince some major 
banks to go back into Iran. Financial institutions operate on 
the basis of  fees and financial reward, just like any economic 
actor. Against the expected earnings for doing business 
with Iran must be arrayed the potential costs, ranging from 
the simple economic (will our business venture succeed 
or fail?) to the compliance burden (can we afford all of  
these lawyers and consultants?) to the regulatory risk of  
a compliance problem still slipping through the security 
nets. Given the absence of  what one banker described as 
a need for “certainty” about the longevity of  the JCPOA 
and its embedded sanctions relief, it is likely that finding 
a mutually acceptable financing structure remains elusive 
for many financial institutions, especially those with larger 
reputational risk and greater financial exposure to the US 
financial system.33 In such a scenario, a potential solution 
could be found in Iranian banks providing the necessary 
financing arrangements. However, Iran’s own banking 
system remains fragile, undermined due to years of  bad 
loans and sanctions.34 
Other Economic Measures
The JCPOA’s main sanctions relief  focuses on Iran’s 
oil and gas sector, and its access to financial markets, in 
recognition of  the fact that these are key economic interests 
of  Iran. However, these are not the only areas affected by 
the JCPOA, and many other industries in Iran stand to 
benefit if  the sanctions relief  promised is delivered. There 
are indications that, even if  forward momentum on oil, 
gas, and financing has stalled, there has been progress in 
these other areas.
Two sectors in particular stand out: the auto industry and 
the commercial aviation industry.
Auto Industry
Iran’s auto industry was an emerging export driver 
throughout much of  the 2000s. But this industry was far 
from homegrown. Instead, Iran depended on the import of  
complete or nearly complete automotive kits from foreign 
manufacturers, which were then assembled and marketed 
as Iranian vehicles. Iran has been trying to limit use of  
such kits and further its own domestic manufacturing, but 
even then Iran had a major dependency on foreign supply 
of  components. This dependency on foreign partners 
was also a vulnerability to outside pressure, first exposed 
in 2011–2012 when oil and financial sanctions deprived 
Iran of  the hard currency required to contract outside 
support. Production took a further hit after June 2013, 
when the United States announced that it would impose 
sanctions on any foreign entity that provided technical 
support or services in support of  Iran’s auto sector. Taken 
in combination with Iran’s overall economic downturn 
and loss of  hard currency from oil sales, Iran’s automobile 
production dropped to its lowest level since 2004. (See 
Figure 2.)
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Figure 2: Iranian total vehicle production (automobile and commercial), 1999–2016
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,35 Tehran Times. 36 
The Joint Plan of  Action (JPOA) relaxed those sanctions 
in November 2013, and Iran’s auto manufacturing industry 
has recovered to some degree. Iran now estimates that it 
will produce 1.35 million automobiles during the Iranian 
fiscal year (March 2016 to March 2017).37 Foreign partners 
remain integral to these operations. Renault, one of  Iran’s 
most significant automotive manufacturing partners, 
remained in Iran throughout this period and has stated 
publicly its commitment to continuing its relationship with 
the country along with its Japanese partner, Nissan.38,39 
Peugeot, which quit Iran in 2012, has finalized talks with 
Iran on the compensation necessary to reenter the market.40 
Other manufacturers may soon follow suit.
More interesting for the purposes of  this paper is why the 
auto sector has apparently rebounded much faster than the 
potentially more lucrative oil and gas sector. Three points 
seem salient:
1. The time period between sanctions imposition 
and sanctions relief  was relatively short. Though 
it is true that the auto sector took a hit in 2011–2012, 
it was not explicitly targeted at least by the United 
States, and therefore the decision for companies—like 
Peugeot—to withdraw was political or economic in 
nature rather than compelled by force of  sanctions. 
This sector was explicitly targeted by sanctions for 
only five months. As such, when JPOA relief  was 
announced, reversing course for those companies 
still engaged in Iran was comparatively simple to 
orchestrate. The limiting factor became Iran’s ability 
to pay for the necessary imports.
In contrast, most oil and gas companies had been out 
of  Iran for three or more years when the JPOA was 
announced, and five or more years when the JCPOA 
was finalized. New markets had been explored, with 
attendant resources shifted to take advantage of  them. 
The same sort of  logic applies with respect to banks, 
many of  which withdrew from business with Iran in 
2008–2010.
2. Long-term exposure risk is smaller than in oil 
and gas. Investing in Iran’s auto industry does require 
some risk exposure and capital expenditure. As 
Peugeot’s case demonstrates, a decision to withdraw 
from business in Iran due to sanctions imposition 
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Figure 2: Iranian total vehicle production (automobile and commercial), 1999–2016
Source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers,35 Tehran Times. 36 
can cost a company dearly, in Peugeot’s case over 
$425 million (though indications are that this cost will 
not be in the form of  a cash payout).41, 42 That said, 
Peugeot’s total review in the first quarter of  2016 was 
$14.7 billion43 and its investment in Iran is reported 
to be $435 million over five years.44 So, from Peugeot’s 
perspective, the cost of  getting back in and having to 
face getting back out due to sanctions reimposition or 
some other political risk is probably manageable.
Contrast this position with, for example, Shell. Shell’s 
annual revenue was reported to be over $400 billion 
in 2015. However, Shell’s total investment budget 
for 2016 is only $33 billion, reflecting cuts made due 
to collapsing oil prices.45 To even consider making a 
sizable investment in Iran’s oil and gas sector (much 
less to contribute substantially to Iran’s goal of  $50 
billion annually), Shell would need to risk potentially 
billions on an annual basis. As such, the long-term 
exposure of  risk is both larger in absolute terms as 
well as in relative terms on an annual basis for oil and 
gas companies.
3. The politics around the Iranian auto industry—
in Iran and abroad—are nowhere near as toxic. 
Starting with the Iranian domestic situation, though 
the auto industry is important, it is not yet central 
to the Iranian economy as is the oil and gas sector. 
Moreover, the auto sector does not carry with it the 
historical and constitutional complexity that surrounds 
oil and gas. It is therefore both easier to navigate for 
international actors and lower in visibility, allowing its 
investors to fly—to some extent—under the radar. 
For much the same reason, the external view of  Iran’s 
auto sector is simply different. It was lower profile 
for those seeking to do damage to Iran’s economy 
during the sanctions regime, known really only to 
experts as a potentially important source of  leverage. 
And for similar reasons, it could potentially fly under 
the radar in a future sanctions campaign against Iran. 
In contrast, oil and gas refineries are big, noticeable, 
and symbolically significant parts of  Iran’s economy; 
consequently, they are major targets for sanctioners 
and therefore potentially more vulnerable than auto 
manufacturers in future sanctions scenarios. 
Aviation Industry
Iran’s aviation industry was the other major target of  
sanctions relief  in the JPOA and JCPOA. In the JPOA, 
the United States agreed to take a more positive approach 
with respect to Iranian attempts to procure spare parts 
required for safety of  flight. In the JCPOA, the United 
States agreed to expand this approach to entire airframes 
and associated services used for commercial purposes. 
Given the way that Western aviation companies operate 
(with supply chains that involve US components that 
exceed export controls’ de minimis content levels), this 
decision effectively reopened Iran to receiving exports 
from US as well as European, Canadian, and other non-
US companies.
Thus far, it appears as if  this relief  is also starting to bear 
fruit. Although there are no public reports of  completed, 
authorized transfers of  new aircraft to Iran, Airbus has 
already reached an agreement to sell Iran 118 jetliners, 
valued at $27 billion.46 Airbus has also been reportedly 
discussing domestic Iranian production of  Airbus 
components.47 Boeing has also concluded a memorandum 
of  understanding with Iran for the sale of  80 planes, 
valued at $17.6 billion.48 In the meantime, other aviation-
related services are likely being planned in Iran, such as the 
creation of  a repair and maintenance hub by Lufthansa.49 
However, the financing issue noted above apparently 
remains a problem for Airbus as well as Boeing, and could 
affect other companies’ business with Iran, even in this 
sector. In February, press reports emerged that Airbus, as 
well as US and French government officials, were seeking to 
assuage concerns on the part of  banks that the associated 
transactions with Iran are authorized and consistent with 
the JCPOA.50 There are few public indications that this 
problem has been alleviated.
Part of  the issue may lie in the fact that, notwithstanding 
the approach taken by the Obama administration in 
advocating use of  the aviation component of  the JCPOA, 
this line of  business is not—as in the case of  the auto 
sector—completely permissible. Instead, in similar fashion 
to overall financial-related activities, Iran is now eligible 
to receive aviation-related services, but the exact terms of  
how Iran will utilize the planes and technical support it 
receives are unclear (including whether this trade could 
end up facilitating Iranian bad acts in Syria, Yemen, and so 
forth). In the case of  bank-related activity, this is because 
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of  the lingering linkages of  US-sanctioned persons, 
like the IRGC, to Iranian banks. For aviation services, 
the problem is the fact that any transfer of  US export-
controlled goods must receive a specific license before 
transfers can take place, even if  the goods in question are 
incorporated into Airbus or any other non-US airplane. 
Until an export license is provided, any transaction in 
furtherance of  US-controlled goods could be considered 
a violation of  US law. It is in part because of  this problem 
that the US Department of  the Treasury released a new 
general license in March, generally authorizing US persons 
to enter into negotiations over the provision of  aviation 
services to Iran.51 
Other Aspects of  Sanctions Relief
The core economic and political elements of  the initial 
phases of  JCPOA sanctions relief  have already been 
discussed. However, there are additional elements of  
JCPOA relief  that at least bear mentioning.
First, Iran has also received relief  from the various 
transportation-related provisions of  the former sanctions 
regime, though it remains possible for inspections of  
Iranian-bound cargo to be conducted to ensure that 
proscribed items are not being smuggled. As a result, 
Islamic Republic of  Iran Shipping Line (IRISL) vessels 
are now being welcomed back into foreign ports52 as are 
Iranian Air Cargo flights. Some of  Iran’s airlines are also 
off  of  the sanctions list and able to legally travel to Europe 
and other destinations, though access to the United States 
remains strictly prohibited.
Second, Iran is also now able to take advantage of  other 
services incidental to and supportive of  international 
trade. This includes export credit insurance for Iran-
related trade (subject to the decision-making of  the local 
export credit agency, as—for example—the US Ex-Im 
Bank has no intention of  providing such support for 
Iran trade nor is it required to do so53) as well as more 
normal insurance protection. Importantly, US financial 
firms remain generally prohibited from engaging in 
such business, as it remains sanctionable under the 
comprehensive US embargo to offer financial services to 
Iran or in furtherance of  Iran-related trade.54 This may 
complicate Iran’s practical ability to gain access to services 
such as reinsurance, which is dependent due to its very 
nature on the sharing of  risk among a variety of  insurance 
companies, many of  which are in the United States or 
have US links. That said, US sanctions governing foreign 
reinsurance companies without US exposure have been 
suspended pursuant to the JCPOA, at least opening the 
possibility for such business.
Third, Iran remains under sanctions for its conventional 
arms and ballistic missile–related trade. Though some 
ambiguity surrounds the degree to which Iranian missile 
tests are themselves a violation of  UN Security Council 
resolution 2231 (which, upon close examination, calls 
upon Iran not to undertake such tests but does not 
outright prohibit them), there is no ambiguity surrounding 
the legality of  transferring to or from Iran either arms on 
the UN Register of  Conventional Arms or the Missile 
Technology Control Regime Annex. For this reason, though 
the United States has objected to the sale of  the S-300 
surface-to-air missile system that Russia has apparently 
begun to transfer to Iran (after years of  delays), its transfer 
is not proscribed by UN sanctions, as air defense systems 
are not on the UN Register of  Conventional Arms.55 
On the other hand, purported plans to transfer tanks or 
fighter jets to Iran would be without question a violation 
of  the UN arms embargo. These prohibitions will remain 
in effect until 2020 and 2023, respectively.
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IMPROVING JCPOA IMPLEMENTATION
The JCPOA has yet to lead to an economic renaissance 
in Iran, as was both entirely predictable and predicted 
by many observers. It may yet be part of  a major 
economic revitalization in the country, provided that 
its implementation challenges can be overcome. But 
how this issue plays out will be critical for how Iran will 
perceive the nuclear deal and any follow-on attempts on 
the part of  the United States to negotiate with Iran on 
other issues. 
The assessments offered thus far on the individual 
elements of  JCPOA sanctions relief  hint at the first 
fundamental challenge that Iran must overcome: 
Iran itself. Through a combination of  its difficult 
bureaucratic and regulatory environment, its uncertain 
political and security situation, and its bellicose role in 
the Middle East and beyond, Iran has made itself—and 
remains—a complicated place to do business. Were it 
not for its unrivaled position in the physical center of  
global trade routes, its natural resource endowments, 
and its well-educated, globally oriented population, 
Iran would probably be relegated to the lowest tier of  
emerging markets as a major political and economic 
risk.
Iran can address this problem, but it requires serious 
and sustained changes to how the country operates 
internally and externally that will ensure both 
Iran’s future economic development as well as the 
implementation of  the JCPOA. Internally, domestic 
reform to sustain banking operations that conform to 
international standards is essential. Reducing the kind 
of  red tape that makes it difficult for foreign companies 
and domestic entrepreneurs to operate in the country 
would also be a significant step forward. Iran is ranked 
118th on the World Bank’s “ease of  doing business” 2016 
index,56 sandwiched between Ecuador and Barbados.57 
In some ways, it is ahead of  other countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa, including in offering 
the legal framework to set up a business and enforce 
contracts. But many of  those countries—Oman and 
Israel, for starters—do not also have to operate under 
the burden of  Iranian domestic and foreign policy and 
the reputational—if  not actual—risks that come from 
doing business there.
President Rouhani appears to understand the difficulty 
that Iran has created for itself. In his campaign, he 
stressed his desire to improve relations with the West 
and to pursue a foreign policy that was seen as more 
constructive.58 However, his ability to set Iranian 
foreign policy and the broader agenda is limited both 
constitutionally and politically. The Iranian system as a 
whole needs to decide whether it wishes to change how 
Iran behaves and is perceived to behave, conscious of  
the fact that—in doing so—Iran could make itself  far 
more competitive economically and thus provide better 
for its population.
Beyond the level of  high politics in Iran, other steps 
can and should be considered to improve the degree 
to which sanctions relief  is felt in Iran. Some of  these 
are fairly easy for the United States in particular to 
take. Most of  the work will fall on the US Treasury 
Department, including the promulgation of  additional 
guidance and information on the standards the United 
States intends to use in judging foreign due diligence and 
how companies can best undertake the recusal of  US 
persons from foreign business decisions involving Iran 
(which could prompt the imposition of  US penalties). 
This guidance will be inherently legal but should avoid 
being legalistic so as to avoid the appearance of  creating 
too much gray space. 
In fact, these existing due diligence and recusal 
standards are often fairly straightforward to implement. 
In regard to due diligence, for example, companies and 
banks should thoroughly investigate their potential 
customer before conducting business, using all 
manner of  available tools, from conversations with 
the customer to Internet searches to private business 
intelligence services. And if  they find that there are 
no indications of  illegitimate actors, including and 
especially those named on US and EU sanctions lists, 
they should proceed with their business, keeping clear 
documentation on their ongoing attempts to find out 
more about their business partner and continuing to 
learn whatever they can about their business partner. 
If  they discover that a customer is engaged in illicit 
conduct, they should stop doing business with that 
customer and disclose this information to regulatory or 
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law enforcement authorities, as appropriate. If  they’re 
advised by their government or the United States of  
illicit conduct, they should stop doing business with 
that customer. These are commonsense steps, but all 
too often sanctions violators fail to undertake them 
or decide against doing so. Certainly, such steps come 
with costs, but just as banks and companies have had to 
bear new costs to avoid being complicit in corruption, 
organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and the like, 
these costs are simply part of  doing business. 
 
Similar steps could be taken to ease the compliance 
burden imposed on foreign companies in sensible, 
prudent ways. For example, companies have noted that 
the use of  US business software by foreign-incorporated 
subsidiaries of  US companies in their conduct of  Iran 
business is acceptable in order to avoid companies having 
to set up entirely different mechanisms for the running 
of  their foreign and US activities. General License H, 
which established this reasonable standard, only applies 
to those foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of  US parent 
companies, however. Consequently, the use of  US 
business software by solely foreign entities who have no 
US connection is potentially sanctionable. This creates 
the perverse circumstance that foreign-incorporated 
subsidiaries of  US companies are privileged as 
compared with actual US companies and actual foreign 
companies. This is the sort of  sanctions problem that 
frequently happens when sanctioners are designing 
layers of  exemptions onto a broad comprehensive 
embargo, but understanding why it happens is no relief  
to those companies harmed by it. This issue both can 
be and should be remedied by further amendment 
to US general licenses by the Treasury Department. 
Other similar, nonmaterial, and—ultimately—modest 
steps to adjust the implementation of  US sanctions 
to accommodate the commitments made with respect 
to economic relief  in the JCPOA could also be 
undertaken with minimal consequence to the integrity 
of  the sanctions regime. Barbara Slavin and Elizabeth 
Rosenberg have also suggested similar steps, such as 
permitting US persons to operate in the compliance 
departments of  foreign entities doing business with 
Iran, that ought to be considered both because they 
offer a measure of  comfort and reassurance to foreign 
businesses, and because they would help to prevent 
sanctions evasion, even if  unintentional.59, 60 
That said, these steps would not be without controversy. 
In April 2016, a similar proposal to cover the short-
term conversion of  foreign currencies in conducting 
Iran trade via the US dollar met furious resistance. 
Some of  this stemmed from a simple misunderstanding 
that such a step was the equivalent of  granting access 
to the US dollar for trade (a claim that even skeptics of  
the JCPOA had to correct). But a good portion of  this 
concern stemmed from the fact that Iran would be able 
to utilize such a modification for its economic benefit. 
In my view, denying such modifications out of  concern 
that Iran could receive a benefit is the equivalent of  
refighting a battle already lost: the JCPOA is in place 
and survived US congressional scrutiny. The more 
appropriate test ought to be whether the benefit Iran 
would receive transcends what was intended in the 
JCPOA, something that is reasonably discernable based 
on the JCPOA text.
One such example of  an overreach in accommodating 
Iranian banking concerns would be the establishment 
of  a clear banking channel between the United 
States and Iran. The concept behind such a channel 
is straightforward: it would involve one or two US 
banks that are expressly permitted to do legitimate 
transactions with Iran, subject to either direct scrutiny 
of  those transactions by the US Treasury Department 
or under an agreed regulatory construct. 
It may be that such a channel was needed during the 
imposition of  sanctions in order to permit humanitarian 
trade to continue to flow unimpeded. However, now, 
the problem with Iranian banking lies less in the 
absence of  clean channels and more in the resistance 
of  banks to take advantage of  the banking relationships 
they are now permitted to establish. It is not apparent 
that a clean banking channel would solve this problem 
so much as it would create a dependency on one or two 
banks chosen for the task. Such a channel would raise 
immediate concerns of  favoritism for banks not selected 
to participate (particularly if  the channel involved only 
US banks, to the exclusion of  foreign banks that would 
remain vulnerable to potential US sanctions actions), 
and it would also create major logjams in the facilitation 
of  Iran trade, as banks would likely assume that only 
the authorized channel would be appropriate to use. 
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There is likewise a false hope in the idea of  establishing 
an integrated global licensing regime that would permit 
individual transactions with Iran to receive scrutiny 
and approval. But such a scheme—which could involve 
either the sharing of  export control information 
between states or an agreed set of  procedures for 
managing such trade—would be immensely complex 
in what is intended to be a more “normal” business 
operating environment for Iran. Moreover, if  the 
channel were to be corrupted—which, given Iran’s long 
history of  sanctions evasion and financial crimes, cannot 
be excluded—then there would be an even harsher 
response from international financial institutions with 
respect to the risk of  doing business in the country.
As unsatisfying as it may be, time may be the most 
important element of  Iran’s return to a more normal 
relationship with the international economy. Time will 
permit Iran’s compliance with its nuclear obligations to 
continue to be established and international companies 
and banks to regain their confidence in doing business 
in the country. Time will also enable Iran to make the 
kind of  regulatory and bureaucratic reforms necessary 
for the Iranians to have the kind of  economy that they 
appear to desire, at least at the level of  government 
technocrats. Unfortunately, time may also not be on the 
side of  these Iranian leaders, facing as they do claims 
that they were suckered in their negotiations with the 
United States and the rest of  the P5+1. The trick, 
therefore, will be to ensure that Iran is able to make 
some progress, even if  halting, in its reintegration into 
the global economy and the rigorous monitoring of  its 
progress. 
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The Kurdish Regional Government completed the 
construction and commenced crude exports in an 
independent export pipeline connecting KRG oilfields 
with the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The first barrels of crude 
shipped via the new pipeline were loaded into tankers 
in May 2014. Threats of legal action by Iraq’s central 
government have reportedly held back buyers to take 
delivery of the cargoes so far. The pipeline can currently 
operate at a capacity of 300,000 b/d, but the Kurdish 
government plans to eventually ramp-up its capacity to 1 
million b/d, as Kurdish oil production increases. 
Additionally, the country has two idle export pipelines 
connecting Iraq with the port city of Banias in Syria and 
with Saudi Arabia across the Western Desert, but they 
have been out of operation for well over a decade. The 
KRG can also export small volumes of crude oil to Tur-
key via trucks. 

